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Abstract
Background: Replicators are the crucial entities in evolution. The notion of a replicator, however, is far less exact
than the weight of its importance. Without identifying and classifying multiplying entities exactly, their dynamics
cannot be determined appropriately. Therefore, it is importance to decide the nature and characteristics of any
multiplying entity, in a detailed and formal way.
Results: Replication is basically an autocatalytic process which enables us to rest on the notions of formal
chemistry. This statement has major implications. Simple autocatalytic cycle intermediates are considered as non-
informational replicators. A consequence of which is that any autocatalytically multiplying entity is a replicator, be
it simple or overly complex (even nests). A stricter definition refers to entities which can inherit acquired changes
(informational replicators). Simple autocatalytic molecules (and nests) are excluded from this group. However, in
turn, any entity possessing copiable information is to be named a replicator, even multicellular organisms. In order
to deal with the situation, an abstract, formal framework is presented, which allows the proper identification of
various types of replicators. This sheds light on the old problem of the units and levels of selection and evolution.
A hierarchical classification for the partition of the replicator-continuum is provided where specific replicators are
nested within more general ones. The classification should be able to be successfully applied to known replicators
and also to future candidates.
Conclusion: This paper redefines the concept of the replicator from a bottom-up theoretical approach. The formal
definition and the abstract models presented can distinguish between among all possible replicator types, based
on their quantity of variable and heritable information. This allows for the exact identification of various replicator
types and their underlying dynamics. The most important claim is that replication, in general, is basically
autocatalysis, with a specific defined environment and selective force. A replicator is not valid unless its working
environment, and the selective force to which it is subject, is specified.
Background
An extensive reformation of the replicator definition is
needed. There are two main reasons for proposing a
more exact definition. First, current definitions and clas-
sifications (see, for example, [1-17]) cannot discriminate
effectively between gene-like entities (being sufficiently
abstract) and organisms, or gene-like entities and simple
autocatalytic cycle intermediates (SACIs; for example,
glycolaldehyde in the formose reaction [18]). There is
obviously some difference between these entities con-
cerning their copying dynamics and exhibited similarity
between parent and offspring entities. However, present
definitions usually use indefinite terms such as ‘almost
identical’ [3], ‘largely intact structure’ [9], ‘relevant
aspects’ [2,5], ‘relevantly similar’ [15] and ‘same kind’
[11] (see Griesemer’s comment [[6], p. 73], about vague-
ness and the validity of ‘same kind’ [[19], p. S359]).
These definitions do not specify the difference exactly,
nor do they clearly mark the borders of the entity-space
that could be labelled as replicators. Secondly, some cur-
rent definitions have been formulated to include only
the genes but not the memes (for example [8,9]) or
other putative replicators of culture. Memes (the gene-
analogue cultural replicators introduced by Dawkins
[3,4]), as we refer to them, are cultural traits, that are
replicated by copying/imitation (for example, words,
concepts, songs, and so on) [20-22].
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Relevant aspects surely count in replication. However,
exactly which features are relevant? To what extent
should these features be similar to each other? How can
these features and amounts be qualified or quantified?
In which case are two replicators identical? What
changes cause the loss of identity of offspring compared
to parents? Since replication is about multiplying an
entity in such a way that the resulting entities are simi-
lar to parent entities, this question is of utmost impor-
tance and the loose terms cited above cannot show the
exact nature of the identity.
DNA replication (as the standard replicative system is
usually referred to) has specific aspects which may be
used as a basis for the definition of replicators: two enti-
ties are made using only one and, ideally, they are iden-
tical. If the DNA is located in a germline cell, it is
potentially the originator of an indefinitely long line of
descendants (see germline replicator [4]). However sev-
eral aspects of DNA replication do not apply to every
(real or putative) replicator. From a strictly chemical
point of view Orgel has pointed out that ‘few of the fea-
tures of RNA replication are essential for a general
replication model’ [[23], p. 204]. Material overlap
(understood as a generative method where some physi-
cal part of the offspring entity was part of the parental
entity earlier), for example, is clearly not a universal
necessity of replication. Anything could mediate the
information-transmission from parent to offspring; it
need not be the parent itself. Cultural traits, if they are
considered replicators, would exclude material overlap
(see [6]) from the universal features of replication: in
case of memes there is undoubtedly no overlap of physi-
cal entities.
Nevertheless, specific differences among replicative
systems do cause changes in the dynamics of replication.
It follows that a universal formalism should focus on the
general aspects that do not change our basic concept of
replication. Therefore, it is important to formulate the
new definition in a general and formal way that clearly
describes what is common and what is different among
presupposed replicators, and which can include or
exclude candidates accordingly. Presupposed replicators
are genes, memes, ribozymes and several other candi-
dates such as autocatalytic protein nets [24], prions [25],
membranes [26-28], chromosomes [3], genomes [3],
organelles (for example, plastids [11]), organisms, kin
(Dawkins [29] describes the individual, obviously the
genome, as a genetic octopus extending to relatives), an
so on. [Note that well-discussed candidates (DNA,
genes, chromosomes, and so on) are not referenced here
due to the large number of publications.]
Earlier definitions are either too narrow (for example
[8,9]) or too broad (for example, definitions based on
Muller’s multiplication-heredity-variability criteria [12]
or, later, by Maynard Smith [10,30]). The former, by
sticking to structure, do not allow the inclusion of
memes, while the latter allow the inclusion of, for exam-
ple, organisms or even supra-individual entities. The
general intuitive requirements that we suggest must be
met by replicators (based on present knowledge, existing
definitions and personal views), are:
1. Potentially autocatalytic mode of generation.
2. Potentially above-chance similarity between parent
and offspring.
3. Ability to pass on some information to offspring.
4. The definition has to include genes and memes,
and possibly other entities as well (as it was Dawkins
[3] who has introduced the term replicator, it seems
reasonable to focus on these two entities he has
suggested).
5. The definition must be able to distinguish
between multiplying entities: genes, memes, simple
chemical cycle intermediates, organisms and higher
level entities (for example, kin groups) in a clear and
exact way.
The general aspects that have been extracted from
most of the present definitions should be considered as
the general, vague concept of a replicator. Those com-
ponents of present definitions that are proved (or will
be proved) not to be necessary (like material overlap),
should be left out. Thus, four questions are raised that
the new definition should be able to answer clearly:
1. What is the difference between entities such as
genes, organisms, SACIs and other reproducing
entities?
2. What are copying, heredity and modularity. What
part do they play in case of replicators?
3. What is similarity? When can we say that two
replicators are identical?
4. What are the common and differing aspects of
genes and memes? What is the definition that puts
memes and genes into the same box but organisms
into a surrounding larger one (this setup of entities
follows Dawkins’ definition [3,4])?
Results and discussion
Multiplication
The first criterion of a replicator is unquestionably mul-
tiplication. However, what exactly is multiplication? In
what aspect is it more than the mere increment of the
number of instances? How does it relate to autocatalysis
and similarity? Consider a simple case where a glass of
water is divided into two halves. No one would consider
it to be multiplication. However, there are two portions
of water where there was only one before and the two
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bear almost complete resemblance (with minor statisti-
cal fluctuations) to the original (except in volume). The
difference between dividing a glass of water and a true
autocatalytic cycle lies in the stoichiometry. Without
input, a litre of water divided would not give two litres.
The ‘reaction’ cannot be rendered to be cyclic, nor auto-
catalysis. Thus, it is necessary that some material is fed
into a presupposed autocatalytic cycle (Figure 1).
What is characteristic of an autocatalytic entity or cycle
(for example the formose reaction of Figure 2[18]) is that
‘ [it] can arise only if there is a pre-existing structure of
the same kind in the vicinity’ [11]. This expansion
requires some clarification of the sameness of the original
and new entities. It is obvious that if the new ‘A’ does not
resemble enough the old ‘A’, then the cycle will not close.
However, the two ‘A’s can be totally different in, for
example, structure, as long as they are functioning suffi-
ciently similar to allow the cycle to close. Indeed, a new
cell is not exactly the same as the old cell but both have
the potential to produce more cells. It is tempting to say
here that the parent and offspring must be similar in
some ‘relevant aspects’, but it just shifts the undefined to
a further point that must be reached nevertheless. For
the moment, let us just say that the old and new ‘A’s
must be equivalent in some way, until this equivalence is
defined exactly in the following paragraphs.
Pre-existence is also important from the viewpoint of
causality. Hodgson and Knudsen [7] stated concerning
photocopies that ‘the original is causally implicated in
the production of the copy, in the weak sense that with-
out the original the copy could not exist’. This simply
means that any autocatalytic cycle automatically fulfils
causality - that is, that there is no need to explicitly spe-
cify it as a criterion of replication.
To conclude, dividing a glass of water is not an auto-
catalytic process and, thus, multiplication (based on
autocatalysis) requires three specifications: (1) there
must be some input of matter (for example, molecules
used as building blocks), which is used to create the
new entities; (2) parent and offspring must be equiva-
lent, that is they must be based on the function of the
entity in the cycle; (3) one turn of a cycle should pro-
duce more offspring than the number of parents (for
example, a regenerated parent and a surplus offspring).
Autocatalysis and the equivalence of parent and off-
spring entities are closely linked and one cannot be pre-
sent without the other. If none of the products of a
reaction is functionally identical to the original, then
there is no cycle at all.
In order to capture the essence of equivalence, and to
decide about whether some structural, functional or
informational feature should be the distinctive factor
among entities, we must ask the following question:
During the lifetime of an entity for whom or what is it
relevant to distinguish between non-identical entities?
The answer is obviously some selective force. The iden-
tification of entities should be based on selection. With-
out selecting anything among entities, there is no way to
search for the differences among them.
Therefore the following definitions are given:
1.1 Selection is a process, acting on a particular
population of entities in a particular environment
that sorts entities according to a function of the
entities. It can be thought of as a single sorting
event, during which some entities cease functioning
while others persist and can be iterated indefinitely.
This is based on the definitions of selection by Hull
[[9], p. 408] and of sorting by Vrba [[31], p. 117].
1.2 Equivalence: Two entities are equivalent under a
particular selective force in a particular environment,
if this selection process cannot sort among them
better than random. The equivalence of two entities
is denoted as e1~e2.
1.3 Phenotype is the function of entities selection
discriminates about. The phenotype defines the level
of selection as well.
The concepts of selection for (a property) and selection
of (objects) given by Sober [[32], p. 99] indicate the
Figure 1 An autocatalytic cycle of the form Σxi + A —①! Σyj
+ 2A (following Gánti’s notation [68]). xi and yj denote all the
necessary input and waste molecules respectively, of one turn of
the cycle.
Figure 2 A truly autocatalytic cycle: the autocatalytic core of
the formose cycle [18]. The framed molecule is glycolaldehyde.
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same setup: selection is a general process that can act
without multiplication.
What exactly is the ‘relevant aspect’ of sameness is
quite irrelevant, until the parent and offspring are equiva-
lent under a certain selective force. This is what Sterelny
et al. [[15], p. 396] tried to capture when they referred to
copying as a teleological notion in their definition of
replication. To see why this definition of equivalence is
effective, let us imagine a population of autocatalytic
cycles. The product of the cycle changes to a new entity
in order to introduce a new cycle. The original and new
cycles can be different, but any difference will only make
sense if this difference is expressed at the level of selec-
tion. If it is not, then selection will not cause differential
survival. Either naturally or artificially, there is a selective
force which explicitly discriminates between cycles. Even
more striking is the example of triplet-groups: UCA and
AGU are completely different codons, although they both
code for serine as they are phenotypically identical. Of
course, this neutrality is only valid in case of a single or a
few selective events, but not necessarily in a larger time-
frame where iterated selection might induce evolution
(non-trivial neutrality will be discussed later).
These terms can be expressed in a more formal way
using equivalence relations (see, for example, [33]).
Selection partitions the set of all entities E into equiva-
lence classes. Entities of the same class are identical
from the viewpoint of selection. Thus, selection defines
an equivalence relation S (or ~) on E. The phenotype is
that function p: E ! p(E) for which it is true, that ∀ e1,
e2 Î E: e1 S e2 ⇔ p(e1) = p(e2). The phenotype function
thus maps entities to such a set that, if partitioned by
the equality relation, has the exact same structure as the
partition of E implied by the relation S.
In order to deal with the actual multiplication of an
entity (growth in number), let us start from a general
stoichiometric notation:
  x yi j k  A B . (1)
In an autocatalytic system (Figure 3) n > 1 elements of
the set of products {B1, B2, ..., Bk} are equivalent to A
(where no xi and yj is equivalent to A or any Bk). If n =
0 then no Bk is equivalent to A. The reaction cannot be
iterated, since all A-s are used up (that is, it is not a
cycle) and A is not multiplied. Iff n ≥ 1, the reaction
can close to a cycle. With n = 1 there is no multiplica-
tion, but sequential replacement where the overall con-
centration of A is constant in time. It can, however, be
depleted easily due to potential side reactions. Nonethe-
less, the system is capable of processing A any time that
it is fed with Σxi and an existing A is already present.
Simple non-autocatalytic cycle intermediates (SNCIs)
belong to this class. Finally, if n ≥ 2, then A is an auto-
catalytic entity (n giving the order of the autocatalytic
system).
From a dynamical viewpoint the growth rate g of
reproducing entities must be larger than the sponta-
neous dissociation rate d in order to overcome sequen-
tial replacement or depletion (see [[11], p. 33], [34]),
otherwise entities would decay with equal or faster
rate than they multiply. It is a potential criterion for
replicators to be in a stable state long enough to be
multiplied at least once (g >d, see Dawkins’ longevity
criterion [3]). Although this kinetic requirement
is implicitly present in the notion of autocatalysis, if
the cycle cannot produce a surplus of A, because the
decay ratio (either due to side reactions or due to the
reverse reaction of production) is faster than the ratio
of production, the process is effectively not
autocatalytic.
From this viewpoint, multiplying entities with d = 0
and g > 1 would be immortal in the sense that a popula-
tion of such replicators would not be depleted at all. A
lack of decomposition (mortality) does not exclude
selection or even evolution, as Lewontin [[35], p. 1] puts
it: ‘Natural selection occurs even when two bacterial
strains are growing logarithmically in an excess of nutri-
ent broth if they have different division times’ - that is,
Figure 3 (a) A simple cycle, that can be autocatalytic if B1 ~ A and/or B2 ~ A; or non-autocatalytic if B1 !~ A !~ B2, where ~ is the
equivalency relation. (b) A valid autocatalytic cycle.
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bacteria are practically immortal in the timeframe of the
experiment but selection still happens. Szathmáry and
Maynard Smith [36] showed that the relative concentra-
tions in the case of unlimited resources change just as
in the case of a limiting environment, resulting in the
extreme dilution of the replicator with the smaller repli-
cation rate in the limit.
To summarize: multiplication, as a prerequisite for
replication, is simply the phenomenological expression
of autocatalysis:
1.4 Multiplication is an autocatalytic process, where
some of the products of the process are equivalent to
the original entity - that is, functional identity is pre-
served (stoichiometrically n > 1, kinetically g >d).
The criteria for multiplication are as follows: the entity
should be stable long enough to reproduce at least once
and the outcome of the process should contain more
than one parent-equivalent entities. The similarity
necessary for the system to run successively was also
defined as an equivalence relation of a parent and an
offspring entity under a selective process. Multiplication
defined here equals autocatalysis, since there is equiva-
lency only where the cycles are autocatalytic. Note that
(according to Lewontin [35]) if autocatalytically growing
entities exhibit differences in their phenotypes, they are
subject to selection - that is, they are units of selection
(this will be discussed in detail under the section on
Evolution).
Variability
With the equivalence of phenotypes we indirectly intro-
duced variability. Two entities may vary in structure sig-
nificantly and still be equivalent (due to phenotypes)
until selection cannot distinguish them. Hull ([[37], p.
32], following Williams [38]) has pointed out the same
relation, although he did not go further than genes: ‘two
genes are similar enough to count as the same replicator
if they react similarly to similar selection pressures’.
Again, selective pressure here is understood as it was
defined earlier (point 1.1): as a single sorting event. Two
genes which are identical from the viewpoint of an
immediate sorting event can still have different evolu-
tionary potentials.
The problem of variability, similarity and ‘relevant
aspects’” was discussed by Aunger [2] (the Queen and
British postage stamps example). However, his solution
of narrowing the causality clause (and introducing the
notion of lineage as a causal linkage) is not satisfactory.
Causally linked parent and offspring entities, like origi-
nal and replica DNA sequences may still have the same
base-order, although they may be differently methylated.
From the viewpoint of the protein they code for they
are the same, while from the viewpoint of the gene-reg-
ulation they are completely different. Even if causality is
present, the similarity of parent and offspring is not
obvious. Sterelny et al. [[15], p. 396] concluded in their
replicator definition that ‘A fossil of a leaf is not a copy
of a leaf’ - although there is a causal link. One can say
then, that the relevant aspect is the one that is common
in parent and offspring - that is, the base order of the
DNA. However, this is exactly the part which tends to
change during evolution. In Aunger’s Queen and stamps
example, the relevant aspect is nothing more than the lat-
eral silhouette of the head of the Queen reprinted in each
British stamp. The problem with the Queen’s head is not
a problem of reproduction: the lateral silhouette does get
reproduced from time to time. The difference is the lack
of autocatalysis: the depicted head will not induce new
cycles producing new heads (and that is why there is no
causal link between parent and offspring here).
So if the equivalence relation (defined by selection) is
used to decide identity, then what are those changes
which shift an entity in the phenotype space to yield a
different phenotype? A change that ruins the whole
cycle obviously affects the phenotype: the offspring will
not be able to function as did the original cycle. How-
ever, what if the product of the cycle changes and the
cycle can go on? Since heritability has not yet been
introduced, let us assume that the change is a one-time
fluctuation. Such fluctuations are lost in the next turn
and the cycle goes on with the original intermediates.
What happens if the product changes and, due to
inheritance, so does the cycle?: a new entity induces a
new cycle that can produce the new entity rather than
the original. The new and old entities are equivalent if,
and only if, their phenotypes are equivalent. Thus, if
their replication rates are the same, from the viewpoint
of selection, they will be equivalent. What happens if
they have the same growth rate, but the old one was an
ineffective chemical drug while the new one cures a dis-
ease? The selective force in this case is obviously not
based on growth rate but on their effect on the given
disease and on the grant of the laboratory that has
synthesized it.
Alternatives of a cycle can be ‘heritable’ as well, even
if no direct template-replication is involved. Consider,
for example, the (hypothetical) alternative reductive
citric acid cycle, where some standard components are
substituted by thioanalogues [39]. In this case, the use
of the thioanalogue instead of citrate in a specific reac-
tion step is not due to template-copying (matching) but
due to the fluctuations in external factors, such as the
availability of resources, nature of the environment, tem-
perature and so. Individual intermediates are replicating
exactly, without the possibility to inherit changes (non-
informational holistic [25] or processive [16] replicators).
The cycle as a whole, however, may exhibit attractor-
based heredity [40,25], if the system can settle mainly
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using the analogues. Holistic replicators in such systems
may, therefore, convey one bit of information (presence
or absence).
Heredity model
In order to deal with real heritable changes, inheritance
must be introduced. Let us start from a simple distinc-
tion of replicators. Szathmáry and Maynard Smith [[17],
p. 201] have introduced the terms ‘unlimited’ and ‘lim-
ited’ heredity as attributes of replicators: ‘Limited her-
editary replicators, owing to their structural
peculiarities, can exist and be replicated in only a few
stable states, whereas unlimited hereditary replicators
can encode for a practically infinite set of varieties’.
Later Szathmáry [[41], p. 2] pointed out an important
property of this distinction: ‘Limited heredity is context-
dependent, since we require that the number of possible
types should be smaller than the number of actual indi-
viduals present’. Thus, the unlimited/limited attribute is
a binary distinction of replicators, depending on two
factors of the actual context: the population size (exter-
nal) and the quantity of variability that can arise in any
one entity (internal).
Let S be the number of possible different, stable states
of an entity and N the number of actual individuals
(size of population). The model, therefore, thus depends
on these two parameters which (without any assump-
tions) can have integer values from one to infinity. Enti-
ties can be classified as replicators with limited or
unlimited hereditary potential according to S and N
(Figure 4).
At S = 1 there is no variation and N = 1 means there
is no population. With N >S the population is larger
than the number of possible variants - replicators have a
limited hereditary potential. However, if N ≤ S the
population is smaller than the possible number of
variants - replicators have unlimited hereditary potential.
Since both variables are quantifiable it seems rational to
include extremes in the investigation. Following this, S =
1 (especially N = S = 1) can be considered as an
extreme class of replicators, exhibiting exactness - that
is, there is no evolutionary potential at all. Note that, at
S = 1, there is no stable state of the entity beside its pre-
sent state - that is, there can be no variation in this
entity. This clearly fits SACIs. In order to prove it, one
must assume that an appreciably long DNA chain is an
unlimited hereditary replicator, as the population size is
smaller than the possible number of types. If we
decrease the chain-length below one point (where the
number of possible types equals the size of the popula-
tion), the oligonucleotide becomes a limited hereditary
replicator. If the length is further shortened, ultimately
we would end up with a single nucleotide, which would
be a SACI (although single nucleotides cannot replicate,
due to the weakness of the hydrogen bonds). Thus, it
can be stated that if we allow the unlimited/limited dis-
tinction among replicators, and think of those of extre-
mely limited (or even no) hereditary potential as
replicators, we would also have to include SACIs in the
group of replicators. This is why Szathmáry [16] has
introduced the term ‘holistic (processive) replicator’ to
denote primarily non-modular autocatalytic cycle
intermediates.
The inclusion of SACIs would imply that the term
replicator is not the same as unit of evolution (sensu
Muller [12] or Maynard Smith [10]), since exact replica-
tors are not subjects to evolution (no variability or her-
edity - that is, are not genetic systems sensu Orgel [23]).
In our opinion, any multiplying entity which fits the
multiplication criteria (1.4), but lacks evolvability, could
still be considered a replicator: this also agrees with the
vast (and growing) experimental chemical literature. Of
course, if the cycle consists of multiple exact replicators,
there still can be heritable information (for example,
presence/absence of specific intermediates). However,
that is not a property of the intermediates, but a prop-
erty of the cycle as a whole (like the distribution of
intermediates).
There are three reasons for this. First, Szathmáry and
Maynard Smith [17] have highlighted the fact that there
are limited, or even non-hereditary replicators with lim-
ited or no evolutionary potential at all, which are part of
the same continuum. Secondly, the ideal gene would be
an exactly replicating entity if proofreading was faultless
(this surely happens quite often), prohibiting short-term
microevolution. The third reason follows on from this
fact. A diverse population of holistic replicators lacking
evolutionary potential still can be the subject of selec-
tion. If there is competition, and difference in replica-
tion rates, one competitor will possibly wipe out the
Figure 4 Domains of the S N space. S is the number of possible
states of a replicator, N is the number of individuals present in a
population of such replicators.
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other, even if there is no microevolution occurring.
Thus, selection can act on a population of non-evolu-
tionary replicators.
Exact replicators are those which cannot pass on any
information (acquired changes) to their offspring. These
entities are exactly those described by Orgel [23] as
‘non-informational replicators’ (in contrast to informa-
tional ones), which are usually non-modular and are not
able to hold (biologically important) information.
Furthermore, since no information can be changed and
inherited by them (as stated by Orgel) they cannot
evolve by natural selection. In contrast, those entities
that do possess some evolutionary potential are limited
or unlimited hereditary replicators with limited or open-
ended potential for evolution. This suggests that evolva-
ble replicators are a subgroup of replicators. Table 1
summarizes the distinction of replicators based on the
hereditary potential.
Nests are non-informational replicators
The very effective distinction of limited and unlimited
hereditary replicators [17] implies that SACIs are extre-
mely limited-hereditary-replicators: with no heredity at
all (or only attractor-based). This is in close relation
with what Orgel [[23], p. 203] suggested: ‘All replicating
systems are, by definition, autocatalytic and all autocata-
lytic systems result, in some sense, in replication’. If we
compare SACIs with genes (as replicators), we can
extract their common and distinctive features: (1) they
both have a similarity between parent and offspring; (2)
both are autocatalytic; (3) SACIs do not have any herita-
ble parts; and (4) similarity in SACIs is not because of
copying (there is no information transfer from parent to
offspring). The process of copying (matching) is exactly
defined under the Heredity section.
Of course, the major difference is in the amount of
information SACIs and genes can maintain or transmit.
This incorporates the fact that genes do have a heritable
part (which, based on evolution, allows a combinatorial
search space), while SACIs usually do not have any
information that can be passed on. Of course, even sim-
ple molecules may provide information as part of a lar-
ger system. The absence or presence of a particular
autocatalytic cycle in a cell obviously has serious conse-
quences. Furthermore, any novel autocatalytic cycle may
propagate to offspring cells, making the change there-
fore hereditary. This by no means indicates that any
change applied to a SACI (the intermediate of any such
cycle) is inherited by its offspring molecules. SACIs,
therefore, are non-informational. According to point (4),
Dawkins’ copying criteria should be dropped in order
that SACIs can be included. Allowing all SACIs to be
replicators implies that autocatalytic entities with no
heritable part can also be replicators.
The irritating problem here is that this statement
completely fits with, for example, bird nests/eyes/
organisms (see [15,42-44]), if we consider such things
to be parts of autocatalytic cycles. This is basically
true, because the earlier presence of nests/eyes/organ-
isms catalyze the reappearance of similar entities in
the following generations. Also one cannot deny the
fact that, as birds populated Earth, so did nests, in
ever-increasing numbers, although they were involved
less directly. In one word, nests do fit the multiplica-
tion criterion (1.4).
It seems, then, extremely alluring to exclude SACIs
from replicators, in order to also get rid of unwanted
nests. However, if we follow this line of thinking, we
would have to exclude extremes (non-informational
replication) from the limited/unlimited hereditary
model. We would also lose the possibility of using the
same definition for perfectly replicating real evolutionary
replicators, or the chemical predecessors of them, with
limited or no heredity at all. This seems an unnecessary
cut in replicators. On the other hand, we would have to
allow, for example, nests to be replicators, which is a
strongly debated claim (see [15,42-44]). This is a circular
problem that obviously cannot be solved at this point.
Table 1 Advanced classification of replicators according to hereditary potential
Evolution Variability Heritable
variability
Modularity Heritable
information
Examples
Modular Unlimited
hereditary
replicators
Units of open-ended
evolution
High Primarily
template-
based
Polimodular Combinatorial Replicators with sufficiently large
number and variability of
modules
Limited
hereditary
replicators
Units of limited evolution Low Oligomodular Modular SACIs
Holistic Exact
replicators
Can be units of limited
evolution, as members of a
system
No Only
attractor-
based
Non-modular 1 bit Replicators which cannot be
replaced
Variable
replicators
Some Modular (presence/
absence)
Replicators which cannot pass on
changes
SACI = sample autocatalytic cycle intermediate
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Maynard Smith and Szathmáry [[11], p. 20] state that:
‘it is important to emphasize that autocatalysis is not
the same as replication. For replication, it is not suffi-
cient that an A gives rise to two As: it is also necessary
that, if the A is replaced by B (or a C or a D), then the
cycle should give rise to two Bs (or Cs, or Ds). In auto-
catalysis, there is no variation, and hence no heredity.
Autocatalysis is an important first step towards replica-
tion, but it is not the whole road’. At this point they
defined replication in terms of heredity and variability
and any entity lacking these should be excluded from
replicators. This statement therefore would exclude not
only nests, but SACIs (and non-informational replica-
tors) as well from replicators. However, it is not con-
trary to their previous statement (SACIs are processive
replicators [17]): it is just a slight specification of a
term. It is, somehow, a matter of arbitrariness whether
or not one considers non-informational replicators to be
real replicators. Nonetheless, the problem of the similar-
ity between SACIs and nests, and the emerged situation
of whether either both or neither of them should be a
replicator, is still valid. In order to evaluate this pro-
blem, let us turn to autocatalysis again.
Autocatalysis in depth
In order to investigate the problem of nests, it is neces-
sary to look at the structure of autocatalytic molecular
networks, since they are the most primitive naturally
autocatalytic systems, and the lessons drawn will turn
out to be fruitful in the subsequent analysis of other sys-
tems in this paper.
The autocatalytic core of the formose cycle [18] (Fig-
ure 2) is the simplest case and it has the special feature
that it works without enzymatic aid. It is analogous to
the reproduction of bacteria or the fission of yeast. An
important lesson is that the different molecules in the
cycle can be seen as analogous to phases of the lifecycle
of a reproducing cell: this is the reason why the cycle
can be ignited alternatively by any of these intermedi-
ates, just as it is by pure convention that we list the
phases of the typical eukaryotic cell’s cycle in the order
G1, S, G2, M.
Not all such autocatalytic cycles are as simple as this,
however. The (enzymatically catalyzed) reductive citric
acid cycle is asymmetric: whereas after one turn all
intermediates are doubled and one oxaloacetate is pro-
duced differently from the other (Figure 5).
The Calvin cycle is also autocatalytic [45] but it is a
complex network of sugar phosphate molecules. The
most important feature for us here is that at no stage
can it be reduced to one intermediate that could create
the whole network: there should be at least two or three
molecules present so that all the reactions can com-
mence (Figure 6). Thus, it can be somewhat misleading
to say that, for example, 3-phosphoglycerate is a replica-
tor: in fact, three molecules of 3-phosphoglycerate form
sufficient autocatalytic seed [46]. Therefore, the Calvin
cycle, and the formation of PGA, is autocatalytic but the
replication ratio of PGA is 4/3 instead of two as in the
case of the formose cycle regarding glycolaldehyde.
Gánti [47] postulated that the metabolism of present-
day living systems rests on an autocatalytic set of mole-
cules that one cannot omit from the system, since all
the genes and enzymes fail to contain the relevant che-
mical information. This postulate has been proven for
all organisms where sufficiently detailed knowledge of
metabolism is available [46].
Here a remark is in order. Although, by themselves,
such simple molecular replicators are non-informational
(similar to a gene with only one allele and perfect accu-
racy), in the context of a larger system they carry infor-
mation that, as in the case above, cannot be provided by
the rest of the system. In fact, the obligate metabolic
autocatalysts are part of the ‘genome’ in the wider sense.
Nevertheless, no change applied to such a molecular
replicator is inherited in the successive turns of the
metabolic cycle, but the presence or absence of such
cycles may be inherited in the successive cycles of the
cell.
It is instructive to consider autocatalysis of the nucleic
acid-protein system from the point of view of structure
and evolution. If we assume that there was an RNA
world (as many do), then RNA was a true replicator
(Figure 7a) and, then, some peptides produced by RNAs
appeared that then facultatively aided the replication
process (Figure 7b). By now the relationship between
genes and enzymes is completely obligatory: none of
them can be reproduced without the other (Figure 7c).
Hence the only correct statement is that nucleic acids
and proteins together self-replicate (each is catalytically
linked to the other). This does not deny the fact that
most of the informational part of the replication rests
with the nucleic acids.
The foregoing analysis of metabolic replicator systems
helps to clarify the burning issue of whether organs or
nests are replicators. It also sheds light on replication,
inheritance and niche construction. The clear answer is
that by themselves nests or organs are not replicators.
Formal stoichiometry of the autocatalytic processes
reveals why.
Let us first consider the bird’s nest. Suppose that birds
can build nests anew. The simplest assumption is that
birds act like catalysts (enzymes) in the production of
the nests (Figure 8a). This is not strictly true, however,
because normally the bird is exhausted and/or is already
fertilized, with the eggs growing during the process (for
the sake of simplicity we consider only female birds).
Thus, we display a nested bird (N-bird) as a different
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phase in the lifecycle (Figure 8b). It is true that only the
N-bird and the nest together can proceed with the ‘reac-
tions’, the result of which is the production of at least
one new bird, which can also build a nest, and so on.
The number of birds and nests multiply with time.
Looking at the lifecycle one can say that the bird is one
phase of a replicator and {N-bird + nest} is another
phase. The informational part in this simple example
rests with the bird, not the nest. These need not be so:
if forms of nest are associated with forms of relevant
memes, then there is cultural and technological evolu-
tion going on at the same time. In this case, it makes
sense to regard the nests as extended phenotypes of
genes and memes together.
The case becomes stronger in the hypothetical exam-
ple when a bird cannot live at all without the nest (of
Figure 5 The reductive citric acid cycle. Note the asymmetric branches leading to the two molecules of oxaloacetate.
Figure 6 The Calvin cycle. It is clear that it is autocatalytic, but it is also clear that one molecule of 3-phosphoglycerate is not enough to ignite
the system. The minimum number of molecules is two (for example, one molecule of Se7P and one DHAP), provided that all the obligate
enzymes are present. (Se7p = sedulose-7-phosphate; DHAP = dihydroxi-acetone-phosphate). From Szathmáry [16].
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course, this could only be a derived character from a
previous evolutionary stage). This would be analogous
to the nucleic acid-protein system.
The same logic clarifies the problem whether or not
organs are replicators. Since organs form in a special
phase of the lifecycle of organisms, it is arbitrary where
one places the beginning of the cycle - the zygote is one
autocatalytic seed and the organism with all its organs is
another one - ultimately it is the whole lifecycle that is
reproduced. This may mean that the eye (and the nest)
by itself is not a replicator, but stoichiometry makes the
situation clear again, as follows.
The net equation of Figure 8c is:
A A B1 12    x yi j. (2)
The equation indicates that A1 is an autocatalytic
entity and B (as a product) is also increased in time.
Thus, a possible autocatalytic seed of the cycle is A1.
(Note that, strictly speaking, one ought to apply cyclic
stoichiometry to all these cases.)
Gánti [47] has pointed out that, if such an autocataly-
tic cycle is given, any of the intermediates (A1, A2, ...
An) is doubled during one turn, thus both the cycle and
all intermediates are also autocatalytic. Therefore, let us
turn the cycle of Figure 8c by 180°, to reflect what hap-
pens from the viewpoint of A2 (Figure 9).
The basic reactions are unchanged, but the net stoi-
chiometric equation, reflecting the autocatalytic nature
of A2, is a bit different:
A B A B2 22 2 2     x yi j( ) . (3)
This equation indicates that another autocatalytic seed
of the same cycle is the {A2, B} set.
If Gánti’s abovementioned statement is correct, both
A1 and A2 are autocatalytic, although there is one major
difference between them: while A1 can start the cycle on
its own (provided that Σxi is present in the environ-
ment), A2 can only initiate the cycle if B is also present.
Thus, while A1 is a totally autonomous replicator, A2 is
a dependent one, depending on its obligatory partner B.
Figure 7 Autocatalytic nucleic acid systems. (a) RNA as a true replicator. (b) proteins (P) appear as side-products of RNA replication, which
facultatively catalyze the formation of the new RNA molecule (dashed arrow). (c) The present (simplified) relationship between genes (DNA) and
enzymes (E), which are both obligatory for the other to be autocatalytic. xi denotes all input materials while yj and zk denote waste materials.
Figure 8 Autocatalytic system of birds and nests. (a) Birds as simple catalysts of nests. No nest is needed to produce new birds. (b) The
nesting bird phase can only continue if there is a nest present (possibly one that was built by the bird, as it is pictured here). Small circle
indicates point where a nest is obligatory. (c) Formal version of (b), with A1 as the bird, A2 the nesting bird and B the nest. Note: Figure 7(b) is
equivalent to (b) and (c) if E is an obligatory catalyst of RNA.
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Since B is created as a side product of A, it seems that
it is not autocatalytic. However, since A is a cycle, it is
always true (disregarding from where the cycle is
viewed) that an existing B is required as a catalyst in
order to give the cycle one full turn, after which a new
B is generated from scratch. Thus, an existing B cata-
lyses indirectly (that is, the new B is not created by the
original B, there are intermediate steps) the formation of
a new B. This is completely independent of the fact
whether Bs are needed in stoichiometric amounts or
only one B is needed for all steps to be catalyzed in all
the parallel cycles, since the total amount of B will be
increased; thus, the replication ratio of B will be larger
than one. Therefore, since the definition of multiplica-
tion (and autocatalysis) fits B, it must be autocatalytic as
well, although indirectly.
The strange thing, that the autocatalytic property of B
is revealed only in equation (3), is due to the fact that
equation (2) informs us only about A1. Equation (3)
deals primarily with A2, but the lucky fact is that the
net equation of the cycle from the viewpoint of B is
exactly the same as equation (3). Thus, as equation (3)
does not say much about the role of A1, the same way
equation (2) does not say much about A2 or B.
The bottom line is: in cycle A, A1 is an autonomous
replicator (or obligate autocatalyst), while A2 is a B-
dependent replicator and B is an A2-dependent replica-
tor (or facultative autocatalysts). This means that if A1
is the bird, A2 is the nesting bird and B is the nest.
Therefore, that nests can also be regarded as replicators,
although dependent ones only (and still the more
important informational part) is ignored in this model.
Thus, analysis can reveal the underlying difference
between dynamically similarly behaving replicators.
To conclude, it is of utmost importance in order to
distinguish between obligate and facultative autocata-
lysts of an autocatalytic cycle. The consequence of this
distinction is that, while an entity can be reproduced
autocatalytically, it may not be enough to start a cycle:
phosphoglycerate (PGA) is autocatalytic in the Calvin
cycle, but one molecule in itself is not enough to initiate
reproduction as it needs at least three molecules of PGA
and all its obligatory catalysts. Any component, which
can initiate the cycle, forms the autocatalytic seed of the
cycle. Thus (according to Figure 8b) birds are indepen-
dent replicators, but not nests (or organs): a nest cannot
produce one new nest because it cannot start a new
cycle on its own. However, as far as a nesting bird is
considered as a phase of a replicator, nests must be
replicators as well: more precisely, the combination of
{nesting bird + nest} form the appropriate autocatalytic
seed. In other words, the nest in itself is no less a repli-
cator, than DNA without enzymes.
Furthermore, there is a slightly elusive difference
between Ai and B: it seems that A1 and A2 are directly
involved in creating new A1 and A2 entities, while B has
only an indirect effect on the formation of new Bs. This
was captured effectively by Blackmond [[48], p. 386] in
the notion of autoinduction: ‘autoinduction [is] where a
reaction product or side product accelerates the rate of
[...] a reaction sequence without directly producing
more of itself. Autoinductive processes may exhibit
kinetic signatures similar to autocatalytic processes’. If
the reaction sequence is autocatalytic and produces
more of this catalytic product in focus, then this product
behaves the same way as any component of the autoca-
talytic cycle. This simply means that any entity, that is
not part of a cycle, can only be an indirect autocatalyst
piggybacking the host cycle. The only exception is
where both A and B are part of their own cycles which
are coupled in a hypercycle (pictured in Figure 7c). Of
course, the major difference between birds and nests is
still the informational criterion, discussed in turn.
Heredity
In order to clarify the difference between informational
and non-informational replicators, heredity must be
explained. For this some definitions have to be fixed.
Copying should be defined as a process that can recreate
an entity in such a way that any change applied to the
original reappears in the new; thus it should be defined
in terms of heredity. Heredity should be defined as the
potential to pass on changes, in terms of variability.
Also variability (and, thus, heredity and copying) should
Figure 9 The same autocatalytic cycle of Figure 8c from the
viewpoint of A2.
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be defined only for modular entities, since without mod-
ules there are no elements of an entity that can change
(and be inherited) such that the entity itself is not ren-
dered functionless.
Again, it is instructive to begin with the simplest pos-
sibilities of information storage in chemical systems
[49]. In this context, molecules act as signs. One can
store information with the quantity of signs, with the
relative proportion of signs and with the fixed geometric
arrangement (for example, sequence) of signs. If the
stored information, in unaltered or changed form, can
be passed on to the progeny, we then have to deal with
the phenomenon of inheritance. It is instructive to look
at some unconventional examples in order to illustrate
the power of these distinctions.
In the simplest chemoton model of Gánti [49], con-
sisting of three autocatalytic subsystems (metabolism,
template, membrane), the simplest form the template
macromolecule consists of n pieces of monomer V and,
thus, it is a homopolymer. The only property that can
change is the degree of polymerization (n). It was shown
that such a mutation (deletion or insertion) affects the
functioning of the whole chemical supersystem (via
mass action) in a hereditary manner [50]. We are, there-
fore, dealing with a case where the quantity of a chemi-
cal sign carries information. If one passes now to a
system, analogous to nucleic acids, where one has poly-
mers with the structure p(VS)n(WZ)m, and where capital
letters denote different monomer types, then such a
template can also carry information with the relative
proportion n/(n + m) of signs. Although, in this case,
the sequence is also inherited, it is not yet utilized in
the system. Sequence becomes important when, for
example, such heteropolymers begin to act as enzymes
(such as ribozymes).
Let us now look at the case of ‘compositional gen-
omes’ and ‘compositional inheritance’, as proposed by
Segré et al. in the GARD (graded autocatalytic replica-
tion domain) model [51,52]. This immediately connects
our discussion to the recent excitement of various
abstract and artificial protocells [53]. This field is grow-
ing fast. Here we illustrate some of the relevant ques-
tions with two protocell models. The GARD model
depicts a population of molecular assemblies built of
amphiphilic chemical compounds (such as lipids).
Assemblies can take the form of micelles or vesicles, but
this is not important for the dynamics in question. The
building blocks are provided in the medium. Assemblies
can grow by incorporating molecules from the medium
in a catalyzed (fast) and uncatalyzed (slow) manner. If
there are n types of different building blocks, then one
can define a matrix b, specifying to what extent mole-
cule Li in the assembly catalyses the incorporation of
molecule Lj into the assembly (where i and j run from 1
to n). After reaching a critical size assemblies split into
two, so that molecules re-assort into the offspring
assemblies at random. Segré et al. [51] noted that,
despite the fact that one only has compositions rather
than geometrical arrangements of building blocks, some
compositions can persist through many generations in a
given lineage. These quasi-stable assemblies have been
called composomes. The relevant information is thought
to be stored in the respective compositional genomes.
Somewhat disturbingly, it was also found that, in a line-
age, composomes can revert suddenly to any previous
state, thus long-term inheritance looked, at the least,
questionable.
Vasas et al. [54] have re-analyzed the dynamics of the
GARD model from, the viewpoint of population genet-
ics. They have firmly put composomes into the category
of attractor-based inheritance [40], where the quasi-
stable states coincide with internally strongly interacting
subsets, via the b matrix, of building blocks. However,
there is a snag. Stochasticity in growth and fission gen-
erates variation, so that these alternative subsets tend to
flip into other subsets (therefore inheritance is not as
deterministic, or exact, as in case of template replica-
tion). They were able to derive an Eigen equation [55],
in which the different species were assemblies with dif-
ferent initial compositions. The metastability of the
composomes translates into some giant mutation rates
(which can even be higher than the exact reproduction
rates). Hence, the population cannot respond to direc-
tional selection and there is no phylogeny. The
dynamics is effectively determined by the b matrix.
Alternative substates are not stable enough to give a
large number of different, stably heritable states. Con-
trast this with the chemoton containing heteropolymer
templates without sequence utilization: there the stabi-
lity of inheritance is due to covalent bonds and template
replication.
Finally, here is the last example from the protocell
world. The stochastic corrector model of Szathmáry and
Demeter [56] deals with a bag of unlinked genes, the
dynamics of which can also be cast in terms of an Eigen
equation (where initial gene composition is the relevant
species trait). In contrast to the GARD model, a popula-
tion of such protocells can respond to directional selec-
tion, unless there are too many genes in the protocell
(when group selection becomes ineffective and, also,
advantageous mutations are diluted out). The reason for
this difference is that the genes are stably passed on as
units (their monomers cannot segregate from each
other), whereas the subsets of compositional genomes
are not covalently stabilized entities.
The case of membrane inheritance is an interesting,
existing, case of alternative forms of hereditary informa-
tion in biological systems [26,27,57]. Several membranes
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(such as the cell membrane, the mitochondrial and plas-
tid membranes, and others) are obligate autocatalysts:
there needs to be a piece of specific membrane in place
for the membrane to grow while maintaining its iden-
tity. This is due to the fact that there are specific import
machineries in the different membranes that only pull
in cognate macromolecules. The key autocatalytic com-
ponent is that the import machineries also import com-
ponents of themselves. One could totally confuse the
cell by re-distributing these import machineries among
the different membranes, while not touching the genes
at all [28]. This is a case of limited heredity that, never-
theless, is of high importance for the maintenance of
the living world. Of course, the components of the
import machineries are informed by genes; but the cor-
rect completion of their self-assembly requires an auto-
catalytic mechanism that is not in the genes. Occasional
losses or gains in the number of different hereditary
membranes were critical membrane mutations during
the history of the cell [27]. This raises the question:
what kind of replicator is a hereditary membrane? The
answer has been given by one of the authors: ‘There is
something peculiar about membrane inheritance. Newly
synthesized proteins are recruited on the basis of a very
limited aspect of their molecular phenotype, namely the
presence of the cognate signal peptide, whose primary
sequence is usually not conserved. A template-like effect
does play a role in this recognition process (the shape of
the membrane receptor and that of the signal peptide of
the imported molecule must be sufficiently complemen-
tary) but heredity is limited. Genetic membranes are
ensemble, phenotypic replicators [...]. They are not
attractor based because their identity also requires
genes, external to them’ [[25], p.1674].
Lastly, the case of prions must be discussed in the
light of recent findings. Prions are infectious proteins
capable of replicating by forcing their alternate confor-
mation (and, therefore, alternate function) on the nor-
mal physiological form of the protein (both having the
same amino-acid sequence). Originally prions were con-
sidered to be simple replicators which were only able to
convey one bit of information: normal or infectious con-
formation. Later, various other strains were identified
possibly with different conformations. Recently Li et al.
[58] performed a series of experiments to demonstrate
that different selective regimes (for example, the pre-
sence or absence of a prion inhibitor) cause the propa-
gation of different prion strains. Therefore, prions have
various phenotypes and these phenotypes cause differen-
tial survival, rendering them to be units of selection. In
order for prions to be units of evolution, it is necessary
that mutations appearing in their conformation are sta-
bly heritable. Li and co-workers have found that new
variants appeared during replication in the prion
population (instead of being there in an initially hetero-
geneous population), with an assumed (lower limit of)
mutation rate of 10-6/doubling - although they do not
exclude the possibility that new variants are identical in
conformation, differing in some other factor (for exam-
ple, some small cellular RNA determinant associated
with the protein). Nevertheless, if any such determinant
is passed on to offspring (during infection new determi-
nants are associated with the infected proteins), we are
dealing with at least limited heredity. Of course, if the
conformation is the same, then only the determinants
convey the information; while if there are no determi-
nants, the protein conformation is solely responsible for
the evolution of the various prion strains. It would be
interesting to know whether the different strains and
substrains can mutate into each other (and with what
rate) or whether only the native prion can mutate to
infectious conformations. It must be noted, of course,
that if there is no supply of native prion proteins via
gene expression, no invasive conformation can propa-
gate in the population.
What we understood from all the above examples is
that heredity must always be a result of copying, and
copying is only available in case of modularity. Szathm-
áry has stated that for the multiplication of holistic
replicators: ‘ [...] replication is not template replication
(copying) that rests on a modular polymerization of
monomers’ [[25], p. 1672]. In case of alternatives of a
cycle (see [39]), the intermediates are not copied (being
holistic), but the system as a whole may exhibit attrac-
tor-based heredity [40].
Only those parts of an entity contribute to heritable
information which can inherit changes acquired during
the lifetime of the entity. Thus, we call any change
heritable that can be passed on to next generation. It
is possible that only such changes were gathered dur-
ing the existence of the replicator that are not passed
on during replication (see DNA methylation, isotope
substitutes in a replicator, and such-like). The part
that can inherit changes is called the genotype of the
replicator. Note that, in case of epigenetic inheritance,
the epigenetic information that is inherited is indeed
epigenetic, but not epigenotypic - that is, it is part of
the abstract genotype of a replicator, more than the
genome. To be more general: if there is a heritable
somatic information, the genotype of an organism is
more than the information in the germline. The exact
definitions, therefore, are:
2.1 Copying: a multiplication process of some part of
an entity, where there is a potential that any change
made in the part of the original entity can reoccur
in the part of the new entity (the part is the
genotype).
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2.2 Heredity: attribute of an entity which can multi-
ply a part of it such a way that there is a potential
that any change made in the part of the original
entity can reoccur in the part of the new entity (the
part is the genotype, and the process of multiplica-
tion is copying).
2.3 Modularity: attribute of a part of an entity, if this
part can acquire changes during the lifetime of the
entity in such a way that the entity is not rendered
non-functional, nor that will dissociate, and that the
new entity is potentially phenotypically equivalent to
the original one (the process is copying).
2.4 Genotype: part of an entity (for example, subset
of features) which can potentially pass on changes
(acquired during lifetime of entity, incorporated into
the said part) to offspring during a multiplication
process (the process is copying).
Note that the definitions refer to equivalence and mul-
tiplication defined above (1.2 and 1.4). Modularity in
this form fits both heritable and non-heritable changes.
Also note that, if there is no heritable variability, there
can be no microevolution. Furthermore, the notion of
genotype implicitly refers to copying, heredity and modu-
larity - for example, the genotype is always modular.
If a variant of a feature is not passed on to offspring
during copying, then that variable feature is irrelevant
from the viewpoint of information-replication, as it is
not part of the genotype. However, and this is of
extreme importance, any change made to any part of a
replicator that is passed on to the offspring is part of its
genotype. That is, a changed base in a DNA sequence
can be inherited, so it is part of the genotype of the
DNA, and if the cut tails of mice were to be passed on
to offspring then the state of tail would be part of the
mouse’s (as a replicator’s) heritable genotype (but, of
course, will not be part of its genome). Note that the
exact method of copying the genotype is irrelevant: the
only important thing is the heritability of changes made
to the genotype. In other words, it is neither the medium
nor the method that counts during the transfer of infor-
mation, but the fidelity of the transfer.
So far our best candidate for a replicator is the highly
abstract genotype; although with this we only pointed to
an abstract part of an entity (like the base-sequence of a
gene), and not to a real, physically individual entity (the
actual DNA molecule). The problem with this approach
is that if the replicator equals the abstract genotype then
the DNA should not be a replicator, since methylation
of the backbone or isotope substitutions are not inher-
ited in the same process. That is, changes made to the
structure are irrelevant from the viewpoint of the mes-
sage encoded in the base order (although it may be not
irrelevant from the viewpoint of replication). However,
our definition would require that any change acquired
should also be inherited. Expanding these terms, one
should come to the point that, if the genotype is a part
of an entity, copying is a process in which this entity is
involved and heredity is an attribute of this entity, then
the entity itself must be called the replicator. The (infor-
mational) replicator has a genotype that can potentially
be copied, thus possessing the attribute of heredity. In
this sense, the definition should be formulated as fol-
lows:
3.1 Abstract replicator: the genotype of an entity.
3.2 Realized replicator: anything that has a genotype.
Note that both 3.1 and 3.2 exclude SACIs, although
ultimately exact replicators should be gathered under
the term ‘replicator’, as was discussed above. Until that
point we will use this working definition, which is in
close agreement with Dawkins’ [[4], p. 83] definition: ‘I
define a replicator as anything in the universe of which
copies are made’. Although it induces a new problem,
that will be discussed in turn.
Organisms are informational replicators
N order to point out the other problem of the present
replicator definitions, let us quote (1) the commonly
accepted definition of Hull [[9], p. 408]: the ‘replicator
[is] an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in
successive replications’ and (2) a more recent one from
Aunger [[2], p. 73], especially the part about similarity:
‘The copy must be like its source in relevant aspects’.
These definitions are indefinite due to the terms largely
and relevant. Both are relative and it is not clear to
what they refer.
As we have not yet pinpointed the exact difference
between true replicators and organisms, it seems reason-
able to discover the common features of these entities,
just as we did with genes and SACIs. Let us do a simple
theoretical test. Consider the case of a simple cell (not-
ing that cells are usually not considered to be replica-
tors). A cell incontrovertibly passes on some of its
structure ‘largely intact’ to the offspring cell during divi-
sion. Also, parent and offspring are similar in ‘relevant
aspects’. The obvious objection to this statement would
be that a cell cannot pass on every change acquired dur-
ing its lifetime - like the full cytoplasm and membrane
configuration (for sake of clarity we set aside those
exceptions where, for example, membranes can inherit
structure (see [59]) and the fact that actually some
aspects of the cytoplasm are inherited (see epigenetic
inheritance systems [60,61]). Thus, there is some varia-
tion in a cell that cannot be passed on to offspring cells.
If we return to one of our favourite replicators, the
DNA sequence (in a Spiegelmanian setup [62]), we can
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state that, despite copying, there are also variations that
are not passed on to offspring. For example, the substi-
tution of a carbon atom with an isotope, or a base with
a harmless base-analogue, is surely not passed on. Thus,
one can see that, in case of genes, there can also be var-
iations that are not being passed on. It is obvious that
there is no real entity that can pass on its entire struc-
ture during replication, but there may be theoretical
considerations based on such abstract entities. However,
based on the definition 3.1 above, one should come to
the conclusion that, if everything is a replicator that has
a copiable genotype, then organisms must also be repli-
cators since, for example, asexual individuals make
copies of their genomes for their offspring. Here the
information in the genome of the organism is the copi-
able genotype. It is clear that there must be some differ-
ence between RNA replicators and organisms or genes
and cells, and we aim to discover this difference.
One solution could be that, in the case of cells (and,
in general, of organisms), a new offspring is created not
by copying but by development. It is still true, however,
that both genes and cells have some part that is inher-
ited by copying. In the case of genes it is the base
sequence of the gene - in the case of (asexual) cells it is
the base sequence of the genome (omitting epigeneti-
cally inherited traits). The process that creates the non-
copied (non-heritable) part of the new gene, or the new
cell, can be anything, it could also be through develop-
ment. In the case of cells, development from this view-
point is merely the processing of the information that is
passed on. This is analogous to the statement that, in
the case of a DNA sequence, it is irrelevant what causes
the variation that is not passed on to the next genera-
tion (for example, methylation or any kind of change
made to the macromolecule). This means that the
potential similarity of the hereditary part of multiplying
entities does not depend on the actual way that the
non-heritable part is generated. There are, of course,
alternative explanations of differences between replica-
tors and organisms based on development, but Griese-
mer’s reproducer definition [6] fits our concept quite
well. He classifies multiplying systems on a material
basis [19], while we focus on the informational aspect.
The two classifications may cooperate: an entity may
acquire its materials from a different source than the
template information on the way to assemble the
material.
The seemingly massive discrepancy of the absence or
existence of development can be tackled somewhat dif-
ferently, demonstrating that developing reproducers (for
example, organisms) are not so very different from repli-
cators. Imagine that the quantity of the structure created
by development during replication (using the inherited
part) can vary from entity to entity. It can span from a
considerable amount, as in case of organisms where the
whole soma is developed, to nothing, as in case of the
idealized gene where hardly anything is developed. Con-
sider a replicating DNA where the offspring simply
copies and inherits the base-order, but the recreation of,
for example, the sugar-phosphate chain is by some kind
of primitive development, using mainly the inherited
information (as is the case of RNA molecules, which
acquire secondary structure by ‘using’ the information of
the base-sequence). Would not it be considered a repli-
cator? The bottom line is this: as long as there is a geno-
type to copy, the entity incorporating the genotype is a
replicator, regardless whether or not development is
involved.
Although it is clear that one cannot advance much
further with the introduction of development, we can
still formulate a few conclusions based on the present
position:
1. Any entity increasing in number (be it a cell or a
gene) has some similarity to its offspring.
2. There are parts in both real genes and organisms
that can inherit acquired changes and parts that can-
not; thus both the cell and the DNA can pass on
some of their information content and none can
pass on its full information content.
3. From the viewpoint of the recreation of the heri-
table part, the cause of variation in (and the recrea-
tion of) the non-heritable part is irrelevant. Note
that the recreation process of the heritable part is
copying, while the process recreating the non-herita-
ble part cannot be copying, otherwise it would be
part of the heritable part.
4. Both cells and genes fulfil the causality criterion
(that is, the parent is involved in the creation of the
offspring).
Although it seems appealing to use only the first state-
ment as a criterion for replication, we have to resist this
route, as Griesemer [[19], p. S356] has pointed out:
‘surely replication means more than just [non-zero par-
ent-offspring] correlation’. If this were the case then
even a divided glass of water or a piece of bread cut
into half would be a replicator.
With reference to the second statement (and Hull’s
original definition with the term ‘largely’), it is presup-
posed that the difference between genes-as-replicators
and organisms-as-replicators must not be qualitative to
begin with, but quantitative. It is this quantitative differ-
ence that is the cause of the emergent qualitative differ-
ences between gene-like replicators and organism-like
replicators. Since a highly complex entity (an organism)
cannot be copied entirely to give rise to offspring (see
‘organisms are not replicators: they do not reproduce by
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copying’ [[36], p. 556]), some part of it must be devel-
oped in order to gain the necessary similarity and to
preserve equivalence, while some part of it is obviously
still copied (the genome, or at least parts of it). By devel-
opment, we refer to a process, which primarily does not
imply the copying of information, but is the interpreta-
tion of information which had possibly been copied
earlier.
Variability - heredity model
If we accept the expansion that SACIs, organisms or
even populations, can be thought of as replicators, a
method should be presented that can handle and discri-
minate among these multiplying entities based on a gen-
eral model.
Let the full information content of an entity E be
denoted by I. Thus, I can be imagined as the complete
set of features of an entity -that is, all those properties
which are relevant for the observer. Part of the entity
is subject to change during the lifetime of the entity
(within-generation change). It is denoted as V ⊆ I. V
can be imagined as the set of those features that can
change state, while the functional identity of the entity
is maintained. This calls forth a subset of I that cannot
change, Vc. One can think of this as a set of conserva-
tive features, which, if changed, renders the whole
entity nonfunctional or even causes its decomposition.
Furthermore, there is a heritable part of the entity H ⊆
I, that can acquire changes and can pass these changes
on to the offspring (the genotype). It is pointless to
think of heritable parts inside the non-variable part, as
non-variable features that cannot pass on variability
and that heredity is defined only in case of variability
(1.4 and 1.1). Therefore, H ⊆ V. Let I be the size of I,
while H and V denote the sizes of sets I and H as frac-
tions of I, thus 0 ≤ H ≤ V ≤ 1. Figure 10 gives a basic
scheme of the subparts (sets of features) of any
replicator.
If we consider that I is unity, V can span from 0 to 1,
while H spans only from 0 to V. At V = 0 entities do
not have variability or heredity at all (H is not defined -
it could be, for example, SACIs). At 0 <V = H < 1 are
entities with some variability and full heredity. They are
capable of passing on every acquired change (since V -
H = 0). As a special case, an entity at V = H = 1 can
have changes anywhere in its structure (without becom-
ing functionless); thus it is a compact entity and can
pass on every change (this would be a hypothetical ideal
replicator). Note that V <H is not possible due to the
definition of heredity. Figure 11 shows the distinction of
replicators according to V and H (a slightly similar clas-
sification was derived by Solé [[63], p. 282], where spa-
tial and informational complexities of replicating
systems can be paralleled with V and H, respectively).
The model suggests that, if we accept that entities
described by the V H model are all replicators, we
should include SACIs, nests and organisms in the group
of replicators. On the other hand, it still allows the
exclusion of such entities, given that they are extremes
of the complete space. The difference is quantitative,
but now we have the factors needed to measure the dif-
ference of this variability and heritability.
Examining the model, a statement can be expressed
as: exactness is not the same as the inability to pass on
variability, although both show exact replication.
Exactness is an attribute of a replicator, which cannot
have new (acquired) variability to pass on and does
not have errors when copying (in general it is varia-
tion-free). The inability to pass on variability is an
attribute of a replicator that can have variability
(acquired or generated), but it cannot pass on any of
its variability to the next generation. Neither has a
definite genotype. So the two attributes are built of
three factors, from which the latter two are only avail-
able if the first ability is present:
1. The ability to acquire variability during lifetime (V
> 0).
2. The ability to pass on acquired variability during
multiplication (part, H > 0).
3. The ability to generate variability during multipli-
cation (erroneous copying, μ > 0).
The classification of these replicators is summarized in
Table 1.
The V H model can predict the overall structure-simi-
larity between parent and offspring - that is, it can pre-
dict the quantitative difference between Ep and Eo (of
parent and offspring, respectively). For this we have to
introduce two more variables: υ is the probability that a
feature (or a module) of the variable part changes dur-
ing a unit of time, and μ is the mutation rate suffered
during the replicative process (the probability that a
heritable feature is miscopied). Parameter υ is the usual
number of effective changes acquired in the time period
between two replicative processes. The overall similarity
S (the total number of identical features) is a distance
function f of parent and offspring entities (taking into
Figure 10 Ordered informational scheme of a multiplying
entity. I is the complete information set of the entity, V is the
subset of I that can change, H is the subset of V that can pass on
changes to offspring.
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account only the time spent since the last replication of
the parent):
S f E E I V I V H I H I Hp o p p p p p p p p p         ( , ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) .1 1 1 1    (4)
Ip, Vp and Hp refer to the appropriate parts of Ep.
The first term (Ip (1 - Vp)) is the contribution of
the stable part of the entity to the overall similarity.
The second term (Ip (Vp - Hp) (1 - υ)) specifies the
non-changed variable but non-heritable part of the off-
spring. The third one (Ip Hp (1 - υ) (1 - μ)) is the con-
tribution of those modules, that are members of the
heritable part and are neither changed during lifetime
nor miscopied during replication. The last term (Ip Hp
υ μ ε) specifies those heritable modules that are chan-
ged during the life of the parent and miscopied in
such a way that they are backmutated to the original
state. The parameter ε gives the probability of this
backmutation per module per replication. This
depends on the inventory size of the medium the gen-
otype uses. If the inventory size is large, then the prob-
ability of a changed module mutating back is fairly
small, even negligible (ε = 0). If the inventory is small
there is a considerable chance (or complete certainty
in the case of a binary inventory) that the result of the
mutation will be the original one (since mutating an
element twice will result the original one). It is obvious
that in the case of υ = 0 or μ = 0 the entity can only
replicate exactly (that is, it is potentially a replicator,
but actually is lacking variability, perhaps due to the
environment). Thus, if I is taken as 1, similarity
depends on five factors: 0 ≤ {V, H, υ, μ, ε} ≤ 1 and, by
definition, H ≤ V. Figure 12 shows the change of the
similarity surface in case of various (υ, μ) parameter
combinations.
The problem, in the case of organisms, is whether
they exhibit an overall similarity high enough to count
as replicators. This is a quantitative question, as it was
pointed out earlier. Preliminarily, we suggest that the
distinction between simple replicators (such as genes)
and organisms be based mainly on two factors: first, the
presence of development; and, secondly, the separation
of two parts - one that can be changed and inherited
and another that cannot be inherited and is highly
stable. Rephrasing this second criterion we see that
ideal replicators do not have non-heritable but variable
parts. Furthermore, a replicator should minimize the
fraction of its non-heritable but variable part (that is: (V
- H) ! 0) if it wants to approximate ideal replication.
Therefore, the abstract, ideal replicator should not have
any non-heritable variability in itself - and this is suita-
ble only for the abstract genotype, defined in 2.4. The
more we loosen this restriction the closer we get to a
real gene (that has a very low variability in its stable
part, the sugar-phosphate chain) and increasing the (V -
H) fraction eventually brings us to (for example, asexual)
organisms, where the non-copiable but variable part (the
whole soma) is a much larger part of the whole entity
than the genome itself (that is a part of the germline).
Classification
As demonstrated, the diverse set of multiplying enti-
ties may include various entities, which, somewhat
arbitrarily, can be termed replicators. To overcome
Figure 11 Semantic domains of the V H space. V: variable part size; H: heritable part size. By definition: H ≤ V.
Zachar and Szathmáry BMC Biology 2010, 8:21
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7007/8/21
Page 17 of 26
this arbitrariness, a hierarchical classification is
presented focusing on the relation of these entities
(Figure 13).
A regenerating/recreating entity can produce at least
one entity equivalent to it. It is possible that the original
entity immediately decomposes (that is, cannot be the
subject of further turns of the cycle), causing sequential
replacement, although this is the most simple of regen-
erating entities. If it can effectively increase the number
of entities equivalent to itself, then it is autocatalytic
and is a replicator. The simplest of replicators is the
exact replicator, which is non-informational, and any
change made to it causes a change in the phenotype. If
a variation can arise in the structure in such a way that
it does not change equivalence of the entity, then it is a
variable replicator, with more than one stable state. If
such changes can be passed on to the offspring then the
replicator is informational. If the non-heritable part is
constructed by a developmental process, then the repli-
cator is a reproducer.
Figure 12 Contour plots representing similarity values between parent and offspring entities (both being modular) as a function of V
and H. Parameters υ, and μ are mutation rate during lifetime and mutation rate during replication, respectively. The chance of
backmutation is taken to be negligible (ε = 0). By definition H ≤ V.
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The classification implements the fact that each sub-
set acquires some new attribute for which all the pre-
vious attributes are needed. For example an (asexual)
organism is therefore a reproducer, a complex replica-
tor, which has a genotype, and the non-heritable part
is built up by development. Note that the evolved pro-
cess of development is able to increase the similarity
of the variable but non-heritable part of an entity com-
pared to its parent entity, which helps (and is assumed
to evolve) to maintain the equivalence of successive
entities.
The housing of genotypes by more complex entities
also implies an obvious fact. The actual, real, physically
individual replicator is the most compact physical part
of an entity that approximates the abstract genotype
best. This means that there can be hierarchical contain-
ers (vehicles [64]) encapsulating the abstract replicator
within different levels.
An asexual organism is, thus, a replicator by this defi-
nition. It is more convenient, however, to restrict the
term only to that most bare-boned, individual part of
the organism, that still holds the abstract genotype (that
is, to minimize the variable but non-heritable part) - the
genome or the set of chromosomes. Even more conveni-
ent would be to refer to the abstract genome (the base
sequence) as the replicator, since the abstraction of the
genome is the genotype. Nevertheless, it is merely a
matter of viewpoint whether one thinks about organ-
isms, genomes or base sequences as replicators, until
the referred genotype is the same. In sexual cases, it is
clear that the genome cannot be the genotype as a
whole, since genome g1 of one parent will be halved and
complemented from another parental genome g2, to
form the offspring-genome. Thus, the presupposed gen-
otype (g1) is actually not the genotype, because, in this
situation only, the actually inherited set of genes forms
the genotype. This is why Dawkins has introduced the
gene’s eye view concept [3] contra the genome.
Evolution
An important question follows: which changes (heritable
or not) affect the outcome of selection? Let us return to
the term of ‘relevant aspects’. Could it be that it is only
the genotype that is relevant? If we suppose that the
phenotype is the identity function of the genotype (in
the mathematical sense: p(e) = g(e)) then the situation is
simple: similarity is only affected by those changes, that
alter the genotype (and not other aspects of the replica-
tor) because these directly affect the phenotype as well.
The amount of hits the genotypic equivalence can
stand was given formally by Eigen as the error threshold
of the quasispecies model [55]. It clearly gives a lower
limit of the quantity of changes with which the original
sequence can still be maintained in a population, where
it is surrounded by its Hamming-neighbours. The pro-
blem with this approach is that there can be changes in
the replicator that do not affect the genotype but do
affect the replication/survival rates. Thus, a change in
the phenotype does not necessarily go along with a
change in the genotype.
Figure 13 Hierarchy and classification of multiplying entities. Each downward arrow introduces a new feature. Inset diagrams show a vague
concept of the parts of the given entity regarding the V H model. Obviously, the replicator continuum can be categorized based on various
aspects, for example variable/exact, modular/non-modular or informational/non-informational, unlimited-/limited-/non-hereditary, and so on.
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In Eigen’s [55] framework, the simplicity of the model
comes from the assumption that it is only the genotype
that directly affects the replication rate (remember, this
was our presupposed condition at the start of this sec-
tion). It is more or less true in case of simple biose-
quences in a Spiegelmanian experiment [62]. It is
usually only the base-sequence (the genotype of the
replicator) that is changed, and, thus, every sequence
has the same non-heritable structure (the sugar-phos-
phate strands).
However, one should not forget that the phenotype of
an entity is not necessarily an aspect of the same physi-
cal structure that encodes the genotype (as in case of
Eigen’s framework). A gene may have its phenotype at
the level of proteins, or at the level of the organism in
which it is housed (the vehicle), or could even have phe-
notypic effects on other organisms concerning the actual
level of selection (see extended phenotype concept of
Dawkins [[64], p. 55]), although it must be emphasized
that phenotypes (and therefore fitness) are specific for a
certain level of selection, for a certain environment. Fol-
lowing on from the supposition that genotypes and phe-
notypes may have different media (that is, the genotype
of a gene is manifested in nucleotides, while the pheno-
type is in proteins/behavior/and so on), it can be stated
that there could be, and actually are, such non-genoty-
pic changes that affect the replication rate (the pheno-
type). Table 2 summarizes the implications of various
changes.
We have already seen that for non-informational repli-
cators only those changes affect the outcome of selec-
tion that changes the phenotype [for example, the
kinetics (2) in Table 2]. Although, since these changes
are not heritable, they have a one-time effect, which
may imply some influence on long-term selective situa-
tions. In informational replicators it is possible to have
genotypic changes that do not change either the pheno-
type [(3) in Table 2], and phenotypic changes that are
results of changes in the genotype [(4) n Table 2]. The
latter is the main drive of evolution, while the former is
almost equally important. Heritable neutral changes are
the primary causes behind sudden evolutionary changes.
The genome collects neutral mutations which (at one
point) overload the robustness of the system, ultimately
inducing a shift in the phenotype space (see [65]). Non-
heritable neutral changes [(1) n Table 2] do not have
any effect either on selection or on evolution.
Note, heritable changes that do not have an immedi-
ate effect on the phenotype may affect the possible phe-
notypic distribution of mutants of the genotype (non-
trivial neutrality), and therefore affect the phenotypic
exploration space and ultimately change the long-time
evolutionary potential [33,66].
It must be emphasized that until changes do not affect
the phenotype of the replicator, selection acting on the
phenotypes will not induce the indirect selection of gen-
otypes. This means that, if there is no selection, neither
genotypes nor phenotypes are evolvable (actually, the
phenotype is not even defined) since all replicators will
be equivalent. In contrast, entities may accumulate
changes in their genotypes that may be called neutral
microevolution. Again, the crucial point is that without
anything linking a changing genotype to a change of the
phenotype, no real evolution in the phenotype-space can
be present. This is consonant with the fact, that direct
evolutionary changes are those that change the repro-
ductive and/or survival success of the given replicator
(see, for example [34]).
In turn, if there is no link between phenotypes and
genotypes, then selection on the level of phenotypes
cannot change the distribution of genotypes - that is, it
cannot cause indirect selection of the genotypes. This is
more emphasized in situations where the phenotype is
directly manifested in a different entity than the geno-
type, for example the gene-protein system, where (for
sake of simplicity) the protein can be thought of as the
entity that is under direct selection. Ruiz-Mirazo et al.
([67]) grasped it as a partial decoupling between the
genotypic and the phenotypic domains, which in turn
allows for the development of free compositionality and
the gaining of a higher complexity at the level of geno-
type - that is to open wide the door for open-ended
evolution.
For a more formal description: let E be an entity
which can be described by the information vector e: {e1,
e2, ..., en}. Then let Ge be a subset of e, the elements of
which are responsible for the genotype g such that: g(e) :
= h(Ge). Similarly p, the phenotype, is defined as: p(e) :=
f(Pe), where Pe ⊂ e. If it is true that Ge and Pe do not
have any common element (that is: ∀ x Î Ge: x !Î Pe),
Table 2 Effects of acquired changes on a replicator
Change phenotype?
No Yes
No (for non-informational replicators) 1. Non-heritable neutral change 2. Non-heritable effective change
Change genotype? Yes (For informational replicators) 3. Heritable neutral change 4. Heritable effective change
Trivial neutrality Nontrivial neutrality
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then no change in the genotype can induce a change in
the phenotype, while selection on the level of pheno-
types cannot be channelled toward the genotypes. Thus,
any change affecting the genotype would be neutral
from the viewpoint of selection.
Therefore, the replicator in the evolutionary sense
must have some additional attribute. There must be a
connection between genotypes and phenotypes, such
that the genotype should channel acquired changes
toward the phenotype which, in turn, should cause an
indirect selection among genotypes. There can be a vari-
ety of mapping functions from genotype to phenotype.
A completely bijective mapping would cause a one-to-
one mapping from a different genotype to a different
phenotype, while the standard genetic code maps 64
codons to 20 amino acids and the stop signal. Of course,
the nature of the mapping, while not effecting selection
directly (as neutral genotypic changes will not affect the
phenotype), has major implications for the evolutionary
potential.
The dyadic approach of changes (genotypic/phenoty-
pic) implicitly suggests that, in the similarity of infor-
mational replicators, there is a second aspect which
may be relevant apart from the phenotype (and selec-
tion): the genotype (and evolution). From the view-
point of selection, any change affecting the replication
or survival rate (the phenotype) is relevant. From the
viewpoint of evolution only those changes are impor-
tant which alter the genotype but, since adaptive evo-
lution cannot proceed without selection, these changes
also have to alter the phenotype (otherwise they are
neutral mutations). Note: selection primarily does not
involve evolution in the sense that entities accumulate
changes through time.
This allows one to expand the definition of replicators
to a broader view where replicators may be subject to
not just selection but evolution as well. This was, of
course, already pointed out by the distinction of non-
informational and informational replicators. The former
cannot undergo microevolution, although a diverse
population of them can be a subject to selection. The
latter, which possess heritability, may open the door for
unlimited evolution.
It seems logical here then to formulate the definition
of entities that can be units of selection and units of
evolution:
5.1 Unit of selection: an entity is a unit of selection if
there potentially exists a population of such entities, in a
particular environment and, according to a particular
selective force (for example, resource limitation), they
are not equivalent, possessing different phenotypes.
5.2 Unit of evolution: a replicator is a unit of evolution
if it is a unit of selection and has a heritable genotype
that is linked to the phenotype.
The unit of evolution incorporates all the criteria of
multiplication, heredity and variability implicitly. It must
be noted that only an informational replicator can be a
unit of evolution, since, for evolution, a genotype is
needed that can copied time to time. Note: the unit of
selection is not exactly the one introduced by Maynard
Smith [30]. Here, a unit of selection does not need mul-
tiplication, although multiplication and variability were
the Mullerian criteria used by Maynard Smith. It can be
argued that multiplication is inevitable for units of selec-
tion. Since selection was defined simply as sorting that
causes differential survival of entities (definition 1.1
above), one can say that selection can sort among a
population of entities without any kind of reproduction.
A consumer may select among goods by their price or
quality (phenotypes), if the chosen factor exhibits some
variation. However, without the multiplication of these
entities, selection would be a one-time only event. The
unit of selection in the sense of Maynard Smith (multi-
plication and variability, but no heredity) obviously
denotes non-hereditary replicators.
The notion of the evolutionary unit (or informational
replicator) is still not enough to distinguish larger
chunks of the genome from short oligonucleotides. It is
unlimited hereditary that is indispensable for open-
ended evolution [17], as discussed earlier. Larger biose-
quences possess this, while shorter ones (and attractor-
based systems) can only have a limited hereditary
potential.
Conclusions
Criteria of the replicator were discussed and the nature
of its functions (genotype, phenotype), attributes (modu-
larity, variability, heritability, exactness) and processes
(multiplication, copying, heredity, and selection) were
exactly defined. According to the implications of these
factors, the following definition is proposed:
Replicator: any autocatalytic entity for which there is
a selection process defined. Selection is a process,
acting on a particular population of entities in a par-
ticular environment, which sorts entities according
to their phenotypes.
This includes informational as well as non-informa-
tional replicators. In Mullerian terms, it simply requires
multiplication and variability (that is, there is a differ-
ence in the phenotypes of a population of such replica-
tors) criteria, but not necessarily heredity. For
informational replicators (replicators with explicit geno-
types) the definition can be further detailed a bit:
Abstract informational replicator (3.1): a replicator
in the narrow sense: the abstract genotype itself that
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is multiplied. The genotype is that part of an entity
which can potentially pass on changes (acquired dur-
ing lifetime of entity, incorporated into the said part)
to offspring during a multiplication process, called
copying.
Realistic informational replicator (3.2): a replicator in
the broad sense: any multiplying entity that has a
heritable genotype - that is, the smallest entity that
houses the genotype.
Using these definitions the first question - What is the
difference between entities such as genes, organisms,
SACIs and other reproducing entities? - can be
answered clearly. SACIs are replicators, although non-
informational, because they multiply autocatalytically,
but lack a genotype. They cannot accumulate changes
during a lifetime that can be passed on to offspring.
With this restriction one can also classify those entities
under non-informational replicators, which behave like
SACIs but are more complex (such as nests, burrows
and organs - but only if they cannot propagate informa-
tion to offspring, unlike in the vegetative reproduction
of plants). This means that the inheritance of informa-
tion equals the possibility of inheriting changes acquired
by the parent during its lifetime. Furthermore exact and
variable replicators were identified (without or with the
possibility of variability) in order to classify SACIs and
organs/nests, respectively. Whether we think of these as
part of the complete replicator-continuum or not is a
matter of arbitrary decision. Nevertheless, the hierarchy
is absolute.
A related question is - What are the unit of evolution,
and the level of selection? Dawkins’ statement about the
gene being the sole unit of evolution (gene’s eye view
[4]) is in coherence with our approach. From all possible
units (species, populations, individuals, genomes, genes,
and so on) the gene is the one that best approximates
the abstract informational replicator, minimizing the
variable but non-heritable part.
Also it was demonstrated by formal stoichiometry that
those heterocatalysts of an autocatalytic cycle which are
multiplied by the cycle are actually indirect replicators
with autoinductive behaviour [48]. Therefore, they are
facultative autocatalysts, although it must be emphasized
that they can only be dependent replicators, since they
cannot be the sole initiators of the autocatalytic cycle.
They must meet other catalysts (possibly real autocata-
lyst) as well, to form a sufficient autocatalytic seed. Con-
sequently, nests (also burrows, organs, and others) are
dependent non-informational replicators, which may put
an end to an ancient debate about whether a ‘bird is the
nest’s way of making another nest’ [42], suggesting that
the nest is the replicator. Based on our argument, a nest
is, indeed, an autocatalytic replicator (although a
dependent one), but it is also true that, just as there is
no causal arrow from bird to gene [[4], p. 98], there is
no causal arrow from nest to bird or from nest to gene,
since nests cannot feed information back to the bird,
being primarily non-informational.
Our final framework, therefore, differs significantly
from that of Dawkins. By applying the useful tool of
‘formal chemistry’, the replicator concept was extended.
We state that not just the non-informational replicators,
but also organisms of higher complexity, count as repli-
cators; we also argue that heterocatalytic products of
autocatalytic cycles are also replicators (nests).
The bottom line of this argument is that replication,
in general, is basically autocatalysis (see Orgel [23]),
with a specific environment and selective force defined.
Although, autocatalysis does not equal informational
replication, the latter is a special case of the former.
Informational replication is a certain kind of autocataly-
sis, where acquired changes are inherited in form of the
genotype (see [11]). If no information (that is, change)
can be inherited, there is no genotype and no template-
based heredity. For clarification, the specifics of informa-
tional replication, copying, heredity and modularity were
defined exactly (thus answering the second question:
What are copying, heredity, and similarity, and what
part do they play in case of replicators?).
When do we say that two replicators are identical?
The whole notion of parent and offspring entities bear-
ing any resemblance (that is, being similar in some rele-
vant aspects) is interesting only if there is something
explicitly differentiating among replicators - if there is
any selection going on. Otherwise competition and
extinction, or even identity, cannot be defined as a repli-
cator. Selection was thus defined as a sorting function
or, more precisely, an equivalence relation applied to a
set of entities. Selection, of course, can be any arbitrary
sorting function not just natural selection. The function
of entities, where selection partitions the set of entities,
is the phenotype. Equivalence was defined as the equal-
ity of phenotypes. Thus, equivalence is specific for a cer-
tain selection in a certain environment. This means that
two replicators are identical if they have the same phe-
notypes - for example, the same fitness in the case of a
single sorting event. Of course, in successive iterations
of selection, these equivalent genotypes may induce dif-
ferent evolutionary pathways. The notion of equivalency
has a very important effect: two entities may be comple-
tely different, but still equivalent, until they code for the
same phenotype. For example, the neuronal representa-
tions of a grammatical rule in two language users may
differ heavily but they are still equivalent until they code
for the same rule, as it is the rule that is under direct
selection. This is the reason why it is so hard to pin-
point a meme in the brain. One should not look for
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identical structures but, instead, for equivalent ones
which may differ but code for the same thing.
The phenotype was, in turn, defined as a function of
the entity (in a given environment) that ‘can be seen’
directly by selection. As the phenotype is not a direct
function of the genotype, phenotype and selection were
also defined for processive replicators, not just for evo-
lutionary ones. Also, for the same reason, it is possible
that the phenotype is entirely independent of the geno-
type. Such replicators are inert to evolution.
Assigning equivalence to a function of the replicator
also means that the specification of the replicator also
has to include the function (and the level of selection).
A replicator cannot be characterized by a simple biose-
quence or a molecule, unless the level of selection and
the phenotype involved are specified. Otherwise one
could not decide if two entities are equivalent. Further-
more, as the level of selection is specific for a certain
environment, this environment should also be specified.
Thus, an informational replicator should refer to the
complex entity that includes the genotype, the pheno-
type, their relationship, the level of selection and the
environment for which selection was defined.
With reference to the question ‘What are the common
and differing aspects of genes and memes?’, not much
has yet been said: this matter will be detailed in more
depth in a future paper. Nevertheless, since patterns of
information are propagated between brains in a way
that is analogous to template copying (that is, imitation),
we argue that memes are indeed informational replica-
tors. We are aware of the fact that cultural learning is
not always based on direct imitation but, rather, on
inference and reconstruction (see [14,20]), but we argue
that even reconstruction can be thought of as a way of
pattern-copying during which information is explicitly
replicated.
A model was presented in order to distinguish among
entities which are able to recreate themselves and do or
do not possess variability and heritability. The conclu-
sion of the model is that the distinction between organ-
isms and genes as replicators, in terms of copiable
variability, is mainly a quantitative one, depending on
the ratio of the heritable part and the non-heritable (but
variable) part. This distinction depends entirely on the
actual parameters of the entity (the ratio of its variable
and heritable parts, V and H, respectively) and on the
actual parameters of the environment (the probability to
change between two replication processes: υ; the prob-
ability to miscopy a feature during replication and μ; the
probability of backmutation to the previous state, ε). As
it was stated, a multiplying entity approximates the ideal
replicator (the abstract genotype) by decreasing the non-
heritable variability that it can acquire ((V - H) ! 0).
However, if this approach is not viable, the replicator
can ‘try to use’ development in order to increase the
similarity of the non-heritable parts of parent and off-
spring. Again, it must be emphasized that the presence
of development does not change the fact that a genotype
of the organism exists (the abstract information of the
genome in case of asexual organisms). The genome of
an organism is the analogue of the genotype of a gene
(the abstract base-order).
An important recognition was that exactness is not
the same as the inability to pass on variability. See-
mingly, the two attributes are equivalent, as no entity
with any of the two abilities can be a unit of evolution.
The inability to pass on variability, however, means that
(neutral) variation can emerge in the structure. Thus, it
requires modularity in order to acquire changes. Those
entities unable to pass on variability simply just cannot
make these changes heritable. In contrast, an exact
replicator cannot have any variability at all, since any
change will change its phenotype.
It has been pointed out that, although material input
is needed to build new entities by autocatalytic cycles,
no material overlap is necessary. This suggests that
every replicator should have some material form, but
the information transmission from parent to offspring is
not linked to any material overlap and can use any kind
of medium (molecules in case of genes, air in case of
words, or electronic currents in case of computer
viruses).
The viewpoint detailed in this paper (that anything
is an informational replicator that has a copiable gen-
otype) brings us to an important new statement. It is
not the replicator that is a subgroup of the set of
reproducing organisms (such as Griesemer’s state-
ment [19], where replication was a special kind of
reproduction), but the reproduction of organisms is a
more specific version of replication with the novel
ability of development. This hierarchy fits the actual
evolutionary history of replication and development
even better. Development is a complex process that
also involves material overlap and is potentially able
to increase the similarity of the non-heritable part of
the entity - the part that cannot be copied. The pur-
pose of development from this viewpoint is to
increase the similarity to the point where it is possible
to further maintain the functional identity (equiva-
lence) of the entity. Griesemer approaches the pro-
blem of multiplication from a material point of view
[[19], S359]: ‘In politics, you follow the money, in
biology you follow the stuff’. We took another route.
Since Griesemer’s classification and ours distinguish
between the different aspects, they can stably coop-
erate (Table 3). This has an important implication:
during replication the material and informational par-
ents need not be the same.
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Another non-obvious consequence of this definition
(both the definitions of the replicator and the genotype)
is that it clearly states that acquired changes of the gen-
otype are inherited. If we now expand our focus to
include organisms in the group of replicators (as
explained above) it should be noted that during the
reproduction of such organisms several acquired
changes are also passed on (that is, mutations of the
genome in the germline and other epigenetic traits).
The inheritance of acquired changes was usually asso-
ciated with Lamarckian, rather than the orthodox Weis-
mannian inheritance. Thus, the redefinition of
Lamarckian inheritance is in order. This is a rather
complex problem not discussed here, but left for a
future work.
It is a clear consequence of the genotypic approach of
replication that, unless certain conditions are met, the
replicator is not necessarily a unit of evolution. In order
to endow the replicator with the ability to become a
subject of open-ended evolution by natural selection, it
is necessary to link the change of phenotype to the
change of the genotype, as the latter is the part which is
conserved more or less intact through the generations,
while the former is the one that ‘controls’ the survival of
the entity in-between generations. From a mathematical
sense it means that the phenotype should be a function
of the genotype. Also unlimited hereditary is necessary
for a replicator to be the subject of open-ended evolu-
tion [17].
The new approach has been used to hierarchically
classify multiplying entities, either n order to distinguish
them or to collect under one term those that are some-
how similar in some features. The model and the hierar-
chy allow us to classify and diagnose not just present
replicators but also future candidates of replicators. It
helps to decide whether they really are replicators or
whether they are missing some basic criteria in order to
be considered as true replicators. The definition will
point out the missing requirements and can even be
used to predict unknown, but viable, modes of
replication.
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